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INTRODUCTION 
The United States patent system is designed to force innovators to make 
a choice: maintain their innovations as trade secrets or disclose them in 
exchange for patent protection. 
Trade secret protection offers the prospect of perpetual protection, but it 
may be defeated by independent discovery of the secret.) Conversely, 
* Princeton University, 8.S. cum laude; Harvard Law School, J.D.; Professor, 
University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1979) (amended 1985) (stating that a trade 
secret is "information that: (i) derives independent economic value ... from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means ... and (ii) is 
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
371 
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patent protection offers protection against independent discovery, but it 
limits the term ofprotection.2 
The patent system is often referred to in contract terms: the public 
obtains information which the innovator had the right to keep secret plus 
the right to use the innovation once the patent expires, while the innovator 
obtains enhanced protection for the innovation during the term of the 
patent. It is elementary contract law that there must be a "meeting of the 
minds,,;3 each party must know what they are giving up and what they are 
receiving. 
Through the mid-twentieth century, innovators were able to make 
rational decisions between the two forms of protection; the decision did not 
need to be made until the terms of the patent on offer were finalized. 
Therefore, the innovator could compare known patent protection against 
known trade secret protection, fully understanding the bargain. 
Four developments have made innovators' decisions more of a gamble 
and less of a contract: (1) patent office disclosure of innovations before 
reaching a decision on patentability, resulting from the introduction of pre-
grant publication;4 (2) delay in processing patent applications resulting 
from increased volume of applications;5 (3) restrictions and uncertainty as 
to what is patentable, resulting from Supreme Court decisions regarding 
statutory subject matter;6 and (4) incentives to file patent applications early 
(and possibly prematurely), resulting from the change from a first-to-invent 
system to a first-to-file system.7 
Combined, these developments force innovators to guess what might be 
on the other side of the bargain. They know that they must give up trade 
secret protection but they no longer know what, if any, patent protection 
they will get in exchange. 
secrecy.") There is no fixed tenn-as long as the definitional requirements are met, 
trade secret rights continue. However, those rights only extend to prevention of 
"misappropriation"-acquisition or use of the trade secret by one who obtained it by 
"improper means." Thus, there is no protection against subsequent independent 
invention, since it does not meet the definition of misappropriation. 
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2011) ("Subject to the payment of fees under this title, 
such grant shall be for a tenn beginning on the date on which the patent issues and 
ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the 
United States."). 
3. Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 4(j0 U.S. 824, 864 (1983) ("A contract, after all, is a 
meeting of the minds."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981). 
4. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (stating in pertinent part that "each application for a patent 
shall be published ... promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the 
earliest filing date for which a benefit is sought under this title"). 
5. See infra p. 381. 
6. See infra p. 385. 
7. See infra p. 383. 
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This Article begins by describing the fundamental patent bargain: the 
federal government's offer of patent rights to an innovator in exchange for 
the innovator's trade secret rights. It then describes how the bargain was 
reached in "the good old days"-prior to the recent wave of patent reform. 
It then describes that wave of patent reform and how the modernization 
movement changed the nature of the bargain, with an emphasis on four 
changes: (1) the statutory revision that mandated publication of patent 
applications while they were still pending; (2) the administrative delays in 
deciding whether an innovation was patentable or not; (3) the statutory 
change to a first-to-file system and the resultant pressures on the patent 
office; and (4) Supreme Court decisions casting uncertainty on the 
likelihood of patentability of certain categories of innovation. It then 
catalogs and evaluates options for improving innovators' options. 
1. THE FUNDAMENTAL PATENT BARGAIN 
All inventions start as trade secrets. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
defines a trade secret as information that-
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.8 
Thus, until the inventor discloses the invention to someone else, it meets 
the definition of a trade secret because, prior to disclosure, there is no way 
other persons can learn it by proper means and the inventor is, by 
definition, taking reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. A trade secret 
lasts as long as the definitional requirements are met; it has the theoretical 
potential to be a perpetual right. Publication of a patent destroys any trade 
secrets contained in the application by making them generally known.9 
The inventor therefore must make a choice: keep the trade secret (perhaps 
forever) or give it up in exchange for a patent. More precisely, the 
exchange is not for a patent but rather for a possibility of a patent. 10 It is 
this difference (possibility instead of certainty) that creates the dilemma 
facing innovators. 
The owner of a trade secret can prevent misappropriation, which is 
generally defined as disclosure or use of a trade secret obtained by 
8. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1979) (amended 1985). 
9. MPEP § 1309 (9th ed., Mar. 2014); see also ld. § 1 (allowing publication would 
also destroy the trade secret as a failure to make reasonable efforts to maintain its 
secrecy). 
10. See infra pp. 380-83. 
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improper means, II while the owner of a patent can prevent infringement, 
which is generally defined as the manufacture, use, sale or importation of a 
product incorporating a patented invention for a period starting on the date 
the patent is issuedl2 and ending twenty years after the date the patent 
application was filed. 13 
While enforcement of a trade secret turns on whether the alleged 
infringer obtained the information from the trade secret owner, 
enforcement of a patent does not. 14 Thus, subsequent independent 
discovery is a defense against trade secret misappropriation but not against 
patent infringement. In addition, once a second party has independently 
discovered the trade secret information, that party is free to disclose it and 
thereby destroy the original trade secret owner's rights; a patent is not 
invalidated by subsequent independent discovery.15 The patent system 
therefore provides motivation for holders of patent-eligible trade secrets to 
disclose them (and therefore surrender protection under trade secret law) in 
exchange for rights that are broader in scope but potentially shorter in 
duration. A patent has a fixed, but guaranteed, expiration date 16 while the 
term of a trade secret is uncertain and depends on events beyond the 
owner's control. 17 
A patent represents a bargain between the federal government and an 
innovator, as envisioned by the Constitution. 18 The Constitution authorizes 
11. Unifonn Trade Secrets Act § 1(2). 
12. 35 U.S.c. § 154(a)(2) (2011). 
13. Id. § 154 (stating that the patent expires twenty years after the date the earliest 
application was filed (i.e., if there are a series of related patent applications, referred to 
as "continuing applications," the tenn is measured from the date the first in the series 
was filed) and that it is subject to adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays 
in processing by the Patent Office). 
14. Jd. § 271(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the tenn of the 
patent therefor, infringes the patent.") (emphasis added). 
15. Jd. § 102 (providing that under the first-to-file system, a second inventor can 
destroy the first inventor's right to a patent by disclosing the invention before the first 
inventor discloses the invention (and files an application within a year from the 
disclosure) or files a patent application. The first inventor can minimize or eliminate 
this risk by filing a patent application as soon as an invention is made. A problem 
under the first-to-file system is the difficulty of detennining just when an invention has 
been made.). 
16. Id. § 154 (stating that it is subject to the owner's payment of periodic 
maintenance fees). 
17. Unifonn Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1979) (amended 1985). 
18. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries [ .... ]"); see also Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. 
Annstrong Cork Co., 366 F.Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa.1973) (explaining that the "Public 
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Congress to motivate scientific progress by granting 'limited term 
monopolies to inventors. Congress implemented this power early, 19 
creating a system that promotes progress by motivating innovators to give 
up trade secret protection in exchange for a limited term, federally 
protected monopoly on the innovation?O The patent laws are not 
"primarily designed to provide a special private benefit . . .. [They are] 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors ... and 
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired.,,21 However, in order to motivate 
that creative activity, the statute offers inventors several benefits; in return, 
the public gets disclosure. 22 
In theory, the disclosure required by the patent system benefits society 
more broadly than trade secret protection because broad disclosure 
provides the starting point for further research to a larger pool of 
researchers. 23 
policy of promoting the progress of the useful arts is achieved by granting a limited 
monopoly to an inventor who fully discloses his invention to the public in a United 
States patent"); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 31-34 (1994) (detailing how the clause was 
adopted). 
19. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries."). Note that this particular exchange is Congress' invention-the 
Constitution does not require disclosure of the invention in order to obtain the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent. 
21. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Sony is not a 
patent case. It involved alleged infringement of copyrights. However, both copyright 
and patent laws are authorized by the same clause of the Constitution, and the Sony 
copyright analysis relies in part on patent precedents. 
22. The Constitution speaks of promoting "progress," not "disclosure." Professor 
Malia Pollack has analyzed the meaning of the term "progress" in the Constitution and 
has concluded that the best interpretation is that Congress was instructed to promote 
disclosure and dissemination of inventions and discoveries. Malia Pollack, What Is 
Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress" in Article i, Section 8, Clause 8 
of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 
754 (2001) {noting that there are multiple possible interpretations of "progress" in Art. 
I Sec 8 Cl. 8: "quality improvement in the knowledge base, quantity improvement in 
the knowledge base (numerically), quantity improvement in the knowledge base 
(judged economically), and spread (distribution to the population)" but concluding that 
"'progress means 'spread,' i.e. diffusion, distribution"); see also id. at 755 ("Disclosure 
and dissemination" is also the interpretation which supports the requirements of 35 
USC §§ 112 and 122."). 
23. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); see also Peter Lee, 
Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659 
(2004) (arguing that patents promote hypothesis generation). 
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II. THE GOOD OLD DAYS 
The innovators ideal would be to have the exclusive right to sell products 
embodying their innovations forever. This would enable them to charge 
monopoly prices and maximize profits. This ideal cannot be achieved. 
An innovator can choose to maintain the innovation as a trade secret. 
There is no time limit on the trade secret.24 However, there is an "event 
limit" on the term of trade secret protection. If a second innovator 
independently makes the same innovation, it is not a misappropriation,25 
and therefore, the second innovator is free to make use of that innovation to 
compete. Thus, the holder of a trade secret risks competition from another 
innovator. Moreover, it is not a misappropriation,26 (and therefore, the 
second innovator is free) to make a public disclosure of the innovation. 
Thus, the holder of a trade secret risks destruction of the trade secret and 
the resulting competition from the general public, and he or she can do 
nothing to preclude this risk.27 
This provides the motivation to seek a less fragile form of protection for 
innovation, and the consideration (in the form of a patent) that the public 
might provide in a contract to obtain disclosure of the trade secret 
information. In the normal contract situation, each party knows what it is 
giving up and what it is gaining.28 
As initially contemplated, the patent system provided innovators with a 
clear understanding of what the contract bargain involved, allowing 
innovators to make reasoned decisions concerning whether to maintain 
their innovations as trade secrets (and take the chance that someone else 
might independently recreate the same innovation and thereby destroy their 
competitive invention) or to accept instead a patent whose terms were 
known at the time the choice was made. 
In "the good old days," lasting roughly from 1793 until the wave of 
patent harmonization and modernization that began in the mid-twentieth 
century, patent applications were maintained in confidence until issued as 
24. See supra p. 373. 
25. See supra note 1. 
26. See supra p. 374. 
27. See supra p. 374 (explaining that in order to maintain a trade secret, the 
innovator must take reasonable steps to prevent disclosure of the secret information. 
While that is necessary, it is not sufficient.); see also supra note 8 (noting that an 
additional requirement for maintaining trade secrecy is that the information not become 
generally available by improper means. Therefore, even if the innovator is entirely 
successful in taking reasonable steps to prevent disclosure, there is still a risk that the 
trade secret will be lost.). 
28. The consideration may depend on external factors (as do, for example, 
production contracts or requirements contracts) but not to the point that there is no 
consideration on one side of the contract. 
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patents. Therefore, the patent process did not destroy trade secrets until the 
patent actually issued.29 
The process of patenting an innovation begins with the filing of a patent 
application,30 which includes specific, one-sentence-Iong claims which 
define the invention and set forth what competitors may not use, sell, or 
import.3l In considering whether to issue a patent, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office ("PTa" or "Patent Office") examines the application32 to 
determine whether it discloses and claims an invention that meets the 
statutory criteria: principally, that the claimed invention is patentable 
subject matter,33 that it is novel,34 that it is non-obvious,35 and that it is 
adequately described in the application.36 The PTa then advises the 
applicant which, if any, of the claims it is willing to allow. The applicant 
then has several options, including attempting to convince the PTa to 
allow additional claims, amending claims to overcome the PTO's concerns, 
or abandoning the application. Applicants are generally allowed at least six 
months to reply to an examiner's action regarding an application.37 
Patent applications used to be maintained in confidence until the patent 
29. Other events could, of course, still destroy the trade secret during pendency of 
the patent application. For example, if a competitor independently discovered the trade 
secret information and decided to publish it, the trade secret would be destroyed. 
However, provided that this occurred after the patent application had been filed, it 
would have no effect on patentability. In this situation, the competitor would face 
infringement (for using its own independent invention) once the innovators patent 
issued. 
30. There are two types of utility patent applications-provisional and non-
provisional. Only Non-Provisional applications are examined. 35 U.S.C. § III 
(2011). . 
31. 35 U.S.c. § 112 (2011). 
32. Id.§131. 
33. !d. § 101. 
34. !d. § 102. 
35. Id. § 103. 
36. !d. § 112 (requiring the application to contain a written description (and 
drawings, if necessary to understand the invention as per § 113) in sufficient detail to 
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention). 
37. 35 U.S.c. § 133 (2011) ("Upon failure of-the applicant to prosecute the 
application within six months after any action therein... or within such shorter 
time ... as fixed by the Director in such action, the application shall be regarded as 
abandoned."); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(1) (2002) (noting that the Patent Office 
usually sets an administrative deadline of less than six months but its administrative 
rules provide that such deadlines can be extended up to the statutory six months by 
paying late fees); MPEP § 71O.02(e) (9th ed., Mar. 2014) ("If an applicant is required 
to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend 
the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set 
by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an 
extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed."). 
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issued.38 Thus, at any point prior to issuance of the patent, the applicant 
could withdraw the application, and its contents would remain secret. As a 
result, there was a bargain in the contract sense.39 The applicant traded a 
trade secret for a patent, and both parties knew exactly what they were 
giving up and what they were getting.40 
Patents lasted for seventeen years from the date the patent issued. 
Therefore, delays in the patent office did not reduce the term of the 
patent.41 
Thus, in "the good old days," the fundamental bargain - limited term 
monopoly in exchange for the disclosure of a trade secret - comported with 
standard contract notions. The owner of a trade secret made an informed 
decision to exchange that property for specific other property.42 
The fundamental bargain began to become complicated, as the patent 
reform movement changed the date when that decision needed to be made, 
then provided strong incentives that increased the number of patent 
applications and so increased the pendency of applications, while the 
Supreme Court cast doubt on the reliability of predictions of patentability. 
38. 35 U.S.c. § 122(a). 
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1981) ("The formation of a 
contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange and consideration."). 
40. Even an issued patent can be invalidated, and the Commissioner can withdraw 
a patent (although that power is rarely exercised). Either of these situations deprives 
the applicant of nothing if the invalidation is based on prior art, but poses a problem if 
the invalidation is based on qualification as statutory subject matter. 
41. While delays did not reduce the term of the patent, they did shift the term. One 
of the motivations for the shift from the seventeen year from date of issue term to the 
current twenty year from date of application term was the fear of an abuse known as the 
submarine patent - an application kept pending for a long period while competitors 
invested in product development and promotion, only to find that they could not market 
their products once the patent issued. An extreme example, U.S. Pat. 2,705,484 
(Mechanism for Controlling the Starting and Operation of Internal Combustion 
Engines), was filed in 1932 and not issued until 1955. Jorgensen v. Kingsland, 83 F. 
Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1949). Delay in issuing a patent does not always work to the 
innovator's advantage. Fad products, for example, may lose market value before the 
patent issues, and therefore, the patent has no value in constraining competition. 
Delays in gaining patent protection can also give competitors time to build market 
power before being constrained by the threat of patent infringement. For example, it 
took Texas Instruments nearly thirty years to obtain the Japanese patent on the 
integrated circuit, the key to the modem computer industry. Texas Instruments applied 
for the patent on February 6, 1960, and it did not receive conditional approval until 
1986. Japanese companies filed objections which further delayed issue until 1989. 
Some thought the Japanese government acquiesced in the delay in order to help its 
domestic computer industry develop. John Burgess, Japan Gives u.s. Firm Circuit 
Patent, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1989, at E2. 
42. Interesting contract issues, beyond the scope of this article, arise where the 
trade secret owner is a minor. 
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III. THE MODERNIZA nON MOVEMENT 
Beginning in the 1970s, patents began to playa larger role in business. 
The emergence of high technology industries-the semiconductors and the 
personal computer industry, which enabled computer software and 
biotechnology-focused public attention on the importance of patents. 
With that attention came proposals to modernize the patent statute and 
increased patent litigation (and with it opportunities for courts to modernize 
interpretations of the statute). 
Four developments, in particular, complicated the innovator's decision 
whether to surrender trade secret protection in order to obtain patent 
protection: a statutory change which allowed publication of patent 
applications eighteen months after filing, whether the patent had issued or 
not; delays in patent office processing which pushed the average time 
before patents were issued well beyond the eighteen month period thus 
forcing a decision before the patentability of the innovation was known; a 
statutory change awarding patents based on filing date rather than date of 
invention, with the effect of motivating additional patent filings and 
therefore greater pressure on the patent office's backlog; and Supreme 
Court statutory interpretations that limit the categories of patentable 
innovations. 
A. Pre-Grant Publication 
In 1975, as part of an international harmonization effort, the statute was 
amended to provide for publication of pending patent applications.43 With 
certain exceptions, the new law provided that patent applications would be 
published eighteen months after their initial filing date.44 If the PTO 
reviews an application and issues a final decision within eighteen months, 
there is no problem. The innovator can make a decision whether to accept 
the offered patent before the PTa publishes the application and destroys its 
trade secrets. In the case where the PTa concludes that the innovation is 
not patentable (or the scope of protection offered by the PTa is not 
satisfactory to the innovator), the innovator can abandon the application, 
and the patent will not be published - the trade secrets will remain intact. 
If the PTa agrees to a scope of patent protection satisfactory to the 
innovator, the innovator can allow the patent to be issued, thereby 
destroying its trade secrets but obtaining an acceptable patent in return. 
43. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (stating that applications are published eighteen months 
after their priority date). 
44. It is common to file patent applications which claim priority from earlier-filed 
patent applications. In many cases, there are advantages to establishing the earliest 
priority date possible. The publication rule measures the eighteen months from the date 
of the earliest filed application from which priority is claimed. 
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Thus, the fundamental contract bargain is maintained if the patent office 
disposes45 of applications before publication. However, if the PTa has not 
reached a final decision on patentability before the eighteen-month date is 
reached, the innovator is faced with balancing not trade secret protection 
against determined patent protection but trade secret protection against a 
range of possibilities of patent protection. The innovator's dilemma is even 
more acute if the application has not even been reviewed substantively at 
the time the applicant must make the decision. In that case, not only does 
the applicant not know the final form of patent protection, the applicant 
does not even have information regarding the PTa's position on 
patentability. In other words, the decision is more a lottery than a 
traditional contractual bargain. 
B. The Pendency Problem 
In "the good old days," pendency was generally not an issue for 
applicants. Patentees could maintain trade secret protection for as long as 
the application remained pending, so there was no trade-secret-related cost 
of delay. With the introduction of publication at eighteen months after 
filing, pendency became important. 
There are two pendency periods of interest. "First action pendency" is 
the time from the filing of a complete patent application until a patent 
examiner substantively reviews the application and issues a first action 
regarding patentability), and "disposition pendency" is the time from filing 
until the application is disposed of, either by allowance and issue as a 
patent or by abandonment). While the PTa measures both46 and both are 
of interest to an applicant, first action pendency is the applicant's first 
opportunity to gain insight into how the PTa views the application and 
therefore the applicant's first opportunity to make an informed evaluation 
of the chances of obtaining a patent and the likely scope of protection.47 
The ability of the applicant to make this evaluation is important because 
of the "trade secret disclosure in exchange for patent protection" trade. 
45. Disposition - i.e., either allowance of claims or final denial of the application-
would be ideal. A first substantive patent office evaluation of the application prior to 
publication would at least give the applicant an indication of the likelihood of obtaining 
patent protection before the irrevocable decision to surrender trade secret protection 
had to be made. 
46. 2013 USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 14. 
47. The inventor still faces uncertainty, as the first substantive action is rarely the 
end of prosecution. The first action does, however, provide important information 
indicating how the Patent Office views the application. In particular, under the current 
system, this is the earliest date on which the inventor will learn whether the Patent 
Office perceives an issue regarding statutory subject matter. Of course, there is still 
uncertainty even if the Patent Office sees no such issue, as the issue can still be raised 
as a defense in an infringement action. 
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Under pre-1975 law, the problem did not arise because patent applications 
were maintained in confidence until the patent issued,48 so at any point 
prior to issuance of the patent, the applicant could withdraw the application 
and its contents would remain secret. There was a bargain in the contract 
sense. The applicant traded a trade secret for a patent, and both parties 
knew exactly what they were giving up and what they were getting.49 With 
the 1975 statutory amendment50 that provided for publication of pending 
patent applications,5l the fundamental contract bargain could still be 
maintained if the patent office disposed52 of applications before 
publication. However, if the application has not even been reviewed 
substantively at the time the applicant must make the decision, the decision 
is more a lottery than a traditional contractual bargain. 
The Patent Office faces a significantly different world today than it did 
in 1975. In 1975, roughly 100,000 utility patent applications were filed, 
and 72,000 were issued as patents. 53 In 2013 (the latest year for which 
there is available data), nearly 575,000 applications were filed, and more 
than 275,000 patents were issued.54 Expectations are that the transition to 
first-to-file under the America Invents Act ("AlA") will result in even more 
applications being filed, as nervous inventors will be motivated to file 
multiple applications on the same invention in order to reduce the risk that 
an anticipatory prior art reference will be created while the inventor is 
perfecting the invention. 55 
While the Patent Office has made progress in the last five years, it has 
been unable to provide a first substantive review of most patent 
applications within eighteen months of their filing date, and the average 
48. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a). 
49. See supra note 40. 
50. Pub. L. No. 93-596, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975). 
51. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (stating that applications are published eighteen months 
after their priority date). 
52. Disposition - i.e., either allowance of claims or final denial of the application-
would be ideal. A first substantive patent office evaluation of the application prior to 
publication would at least give the applicant an indication of the likelihood of obtaining 
patent protection before the irrevocable decision to surrender trade secret protection 
had to be made. 
53. U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2013, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taflus_stat.htm (showing that the exact 
numbers were 101,014 applications filed and 72,000 issued. Of course, the issued 
patents were unlikely to have been filed in the same year they were issued because of 
the time taken to examine an application. The numbers, however, are representative. 
Between 1970 and 1980, applications ranged from 99,298 to 104,329, and issued 
patents ranged from 48,854 to 78,317.). 
54. Id. 
55. Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-Definition of 
"First-to-Invent", 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 796 (1998). 
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time to reach a final decision on patentability approaches two and a half 
years. 56 Assuming that two weeks would be sufficient time for an inventor 
to receive a first substantive action, evaluate it, and make a decision 
whether to continue with the application or abandon it, the average 
pendency to first action would need to be reduced to sixteen-and-a-half 
months in order to allow for a decision to abandon the application to be 
communicated to the PTO in time to withdraw the application from 
publication. 57 
In part, the pendency problem can be traced to a PTO policy known as 
"compact prosecution," i.e., the identification of all issues related to 
patentability in the first substantive response to the applicant. 58 Patent 
Office guidance to its examiners cautions against "piecemeal prosecution": 
Piecemeal examination should be avoided as much as possible. The 
examiner ordinarily should reject each claim on all valid grounds 
available. . . . Rejections on grounds such as lack of proper disclosure, 
lack of enablement, indefiniteness and res judicata should be applied 
where appropriate even though there may be a seemingly sufficient 
rejection on the basis of prior art. 59 
On the positive side, compact prosecution gives the applicant as 
complete a picture as possible of the hurdles (if any) to patentability. There 
is, however, also a negative side because compact prosecution requires 
more work and therefore extends the time from filing until an application is 
even examined, delaying the point at which the applicant gets initial insight 
into the Patent Office's position on patentability.60 
Prior to the adoption of pre-grant publication, this delay would have had 
no adverse impact on the innovator, as trade secret rights remained intact 
during the delay. Therefore, prior to issue (and surrender of the trade 
56. USPTO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REp., supra note 46, at 16 
(revealing that average pendency to first action was 18.2 months and to disposition 
29.1 months in 2010. Five years ago, the average time to first action was 26.9 months, 
and the average time to disposition was 34.7 months.). 
57. 37 C.F.R § 1.138(c) (2002) (stating that an applicant can avoid publication by 
filing an express abandonment of an application under). Cf MPEP § 1120 (9th ed., 
Mar. 2014) ("The Office cannot discontinue the pre-grant publication process during 
the last two to four weeks of the pUblication process.") It would therefore appear that 
the Patent Office must receive notice of abandonment no later than (and possibly 
earlier than) seventeen months from the effective application date. 
58. 37 C.F.R § 1.l04(b) ("The examiner's action wiIl be complete as to all matters, 
except that in appropriate circumstances, such as misjoinder of invention, fundamental 
defects in the application, and the like, the action of the examiner may be limited to 
such matters before further action is made."); MPEP § 706.03. 
59. MPEP § 707.07(g). 
60. An administrative decision to relax the rules of compact prosecution would 
benefit innovators. See Max S. Oppenheimer, Rethinking Compact Prosecution, 25 
ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 257 (2015). 
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secrets disclosed by the patent), the innovator would have received (and 
approved) the exact language reflecting what the patent claims would cover 
(and therefore deny to competitors). The patent bargain reflected a fully 
informed choice by the innovator, made at a time when both options (trade 
secrecy or defined patent protection) were available. 61 
However, with the publication clock ticking, a policy which delays the 
time at which the innovator can make an informed evaluation of what the 
Patent Office might offer in exchange for the innovator's trade secrets is a 
negative. 
C. The Redefinition of Inventorship: First-Io-File 
The move from the historical first-to-invent system to a first-to-file 
system was highly contentious.62 During that debate, proponents of the 
historical system worried about the impact of the change on the quality and 
pendency of patent applications. Under the historical first-to-invent 
system, the first inventor was entitled to a patent if an application was filed 
within a year of the first public disclosure or offer of sale of the invention.63 
Under a first-to-file system, if the technology claimed in a patent 
application is already in the prior art64 as of the date the application is filed, 
the application will be rejected.65 Critics of the first-to-file system were 
therefore concerned that such a system would force inventors to file 
multiple premature and sketchy disclosures for fear of losing out to a later 
inventor who managed to draft an application more quickly.66 This, critics 
61. Even an issued patent is, of course, subject to subsequent challenge. A patent 
owner also has options for dealing with errors in an issued patent, provided the errors 
were not made with deceptive intent. 
62. President's Commission on the Patent System, To Promote the Progress of ... 
Useful Arts in an Age of Exploding Technology at 5 (1966) (The proposed change was 
formally aired in the 1966 recommendation by President Johnson's Commission on the 
Patent System.); see also Statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Sec'y & Comm'r of 
Patents & Trademarks (Mar. 16, 1987), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
go/0g/conlfiles/consI23.htm (supporting the 1987 move by the Clinton 
Administration); Max S. Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: Is 
New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 445 
(2006) (noting arguments for and against the two systems). 
63. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
64. Id. § 102(a)(I)-(2) (explaining that "prior art" refers to information which is 
relevant to a determination of patentability: information which was available to the 
public through a printed publication, through public use, through an offer of sale, "or 
otherwise available to the public," expanded by the legal fiction that issued patents and 
published patent applications are treated as though they were published on their filing 
date, not the date on which the public has access to them). 
65. 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also id. § 102 (defining prior art which may be used as the 
basis for rejecting claims as not novel and also as the basis for rejecting claims as 
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103). 
66. See, e.g., MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, PATENT INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 
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worried, would lead to an increased burden on the Patent Office, which 
would need to respond either by lowering examination quality or tolerating 
increased application pendency.67 Former Patent Commissioner, Donald 
W. Banner, noted that the negative impact of the system would fall 
disproportionately on inventors with limited resources. 68 
On March 15, 2013, the debate ended, and the first-to-file system went 
into full effect. 69 
While it is too soon for definitive data, one commentator pointed to 
Japan as a first-to-file country whose experience was predictive: over five 
times as many applications are filed in Japan than in the United States, and 
many of the 600,000 Japanese applications are "scraps of papers written by 
the inventors and submitted for a priority date.,,7o 
United States standards would penalize such cursory applications 
because the Patent Act sets a higher standard of disclosure, one sufficient to 
enable those of ordinary skill in the field to make and use the invention. 71 
If the United States continues to maintain its standards of enablement, 
United States inventors will face a disadvantage since they are required to 
file their applications in the United States,n and the higher standards 
24 (1984) (noting that first-to-file would encourage a race to the patent office with 
"hasty application drafting with limited experimental exemplification or support"); 
Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes--A Proposed Re-Definition of "First-to-
Invent", 49 ALA. L. REv. 755, 755, 796 (1998) (arguing that applicants may be "forced 
to file continuation-in-part applications in increased numbers" under a first-to-file 
system); Gregory 1. Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority: Protection for the First to 
File or the First to Invent?, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 872, 885 (1990) 
(cautioning that "there are significant risks that result from over-encouraging early 
filing"). 
67. See, e.g., Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: a 
Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-jile Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
687, 704 (1993). 
68. Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALTIMORE INTELL. PROP. 
L. J. 9 (1992). 
69. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (prior to 2013 
amendment) (technical corrections amendments); see also 35 U.S.C. § 100. 
70. Charles R. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International 
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 8 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 543, 573 (1988) 
(noting the major part of a Japanese application contains marketing and sales 
promotion aspects of an invention. The actual detailed description of the invention 
itself is typically done in a very general manner [and] ... the detail of black boxes is 
generally left undescribed even though the specific contents may not be readily 
available on the market.). See also Samson Helfgott, Differences Between u.s. and 
Japanese Patent Applications, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (stating that, 
in the United States, "black boxes" would fail the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112). 
71. 35 U.S.c. § 112. 
72. Id. § 184 (requiring United States inventors to file in the United States and wait 
six months before filing abroad or to obtain a foreign filing license). 
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translate into longer time to prepare the application (and therefore a later 
priority date). Therefore, a prudent United States inventor, unable to take 
advantage of more relaxed filing requirements abroad, would need to file at 
least two applications per invention: a minimal application to protect 
against lower-standard foreign filings and a fully-enabled application to 
meet United States standards. Therefore, even if inventive activity does not 
increase, it would be expected that filings would increase. These additional 
filings would increase the burden on the PTO and would be expected to 
increase pendency times. 
D. Supreme Court Activism 
Adding even greater complexity, the Supreme Court's evolving 
definition of patentable subject matter has made it harder to predict whether 
an innovation will be patentable or not/3 even if it represents a dramatic 
breakthrough. 
Patents are only granted for certain types of inventions, known as 
"statutory subject matter" and defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 as machines, 
manufactures, compositions of matter and processes.74 The list of 
patentable subject matter, though broad,75 is exclusive.76 
More than 250 years ago, the Supreme Court held that Congress has 
"plenary" power to decide how to implement the Constitutional power to 
promote progress through the patent system/7 and more recently, the Court 
73. See infra pp. 391-92 (stating that there is always uncertainty in predicting 
patentability of an invention. Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, a patent will be denied 
if the claimed invention was already known or is merely an obvious extension of what 
was already known. Because it is impossible to fully characterize the prior art (some of 
which may be contained in patent applications which have been pending less than 
eighteen months and are therefore inaccessible), there is always an element of 
uncertainty around a patentability opinion. This is an unavoidable aspect of the priority 
system and one that is not even fully removed upon grant of the patent. Even an issued 
patent is subject to invalidation based on prior art that was not before the Patent Office 
during examination. However, the issue of patentable subject matter is a different (and 
solvable) uncertainty.). 
74. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
75. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952) (stating 
that manufacture includes "anything under the sun that is made by man"); see also 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (rejecting the argument that a 
genetically engineered bacterium was implicitly excluded from statutory subject matter 
because, although a "composition of matter" it was alive). 
76. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o patent is 
available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within 
one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 .... "). 
77. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202,206 (1843) ("[T]he powers of Congress to 
legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and ... 
there are no restraints on its exercise .... "); see also Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. 199 
(1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852); Bloomerv. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340 
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warned lower courts not to read words into the patent statute.78 This has 
not stopped the Court from creating exceptions to the categories of 
statutory subject matter79 that are established by the clear words of the 
statute. 
While the statutory language chosen by Congress is broad and has 
remained largely unchanged since first enacted in 1790, the Supreme 
Court has engrafted limitations on what otherwise appears to be a clear 
statement of Congressional intent. Moreover, the Court has revised its 
interpretation several times, leaving researchers uncertain as to what can 
be protected (and therefore what research might be justified 
economically).80 
While the statute authorizes four categories of statutory subject matter, 
the Supreme Court has excluded "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
ideas,,81 from patent protection (even if they fall within one of the four 
categories) because "[p]henomena of nature ... mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are... the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.,,82 This matters, not only because the Court's 
definition is narrower than the statute's, but more importantly because the 
Court's definition is less predictable than the statute's. The 
unpredictability of the Supreme Court's definition is clearly shown by the 
difficulty the Federal Circuit has had in applying it; in every recent 
statutory subject matter case reaching the Supreme Court, it has reversed 
the Federal Circuit. 83 In dealing with these reversals, the Federal Circuit 
has noted the difficulty of fathoming the Supreme Court's instructions. Its 
frustration is evident in passages such as the following: 
The Supreme Court has not been clear. . . as to whether such subject 
matter is excluded from the scope of Sec. 101 because it represents laws 
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. The Supreme Court also 
has not been clear as to exactly what kind of mathematical subject matter 
(1864); Eunson v. Dodge, 85 U.S. 414 (1873). 
78. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
79. Id.; see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63 (1972). 
80. Max S. Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation 
of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2012). 
81. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185 ("Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas are ... unpatentable."); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72 ("Phenomena of nature, 
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."); Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("Laws of nature ... 
are part of the storehouse of knowledge ... free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none."). 
82. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
83. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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may not be patented .... The Supreme Court has not set forth, however, 
. I I' 84 any consIstent or c ear exp anatlOn . . . . 
Given this uncertainty at the nation's specialized patent court, it is 
understandable that patent applicants would face difficulty in evaluating 
this aspect of patentability of their inventions - and therefore in evaluating 
the wisdom of surrendering trade secret protection. This uncertainty as to 
property rights is a disincentive for inventors to spend the time on 
fundamental research and for investors to provide the necessary funding. 85 
The clearest explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of these 
judicial exclusions may be found in Justice Breyer's dissent from the 
dismissal of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite. 86 
The relevant principle oflaw "[e]xclude[s] from ... patent protection ... 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and ideas.,,87 The justification for 
the principle does not lie in any claim that "laws of nature" are obvious, 
or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful. To the 
contrary, research into such matters may be costly and time-consuming; 
monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and 
that research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the 
reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can 
impede rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," 
the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. U.S. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The problem arises from the fact that patents do 
not only encourage research by providing monetary incentives for 
invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by 
impeding the free exchange of information .... 88 
As noted by Federal Circuit Judge Newman in 1994 "[t]he boundary 
between patentable and unpatentable subject matter is not always a bright 
line.,,89 Matters have not improved in the interim. The definition of 
84. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
85. At a minimum, uncertainty results in higher costs of investment capital. 
86. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs. Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
87. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,185 (1981). 
88. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 548 U.S. at 126-27. 
89. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1568 n.19 ("The Supreme Court has not been clear, 
however, as to whether such subject matter is excluded from the scope of § 101 
because it represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas."); see also 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186 (viewing mathematical algorithm as a law of nature); 
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (treating mathematical algorithm as an 'idea'). 
The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind of mathematical 
subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme Court has used, among others, the 
terms 'mathematical algorithm,' 'mathematical formula,' and 'mathematical equation' 
to describe types of mathematical subject matter not entitled to patent protection 
standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any consistent or clear 
explanation of what it intended by such terms or how these terms are related, if at all. 
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statutory subject matter has puzzled the Federal Circuit90 and 
commentators. 91 
The Supreme Court itself noted that the "line between a patentable 
process and an unpatentable principle is not always clear.,,92 The PTO and 
Federal Circuit, in trying to implement the Supreme Court's evolving 
definition of statutory subject matter, have announced and then abandoned 
(or had overruled), a series of patentable subject matter rubrics: the 
"technological arts" test93; the "Freeman-Waiter-Abele test,,94; the "mental 
step" test95; the mathematical algorithm test96; the "machine implemented" 
90. See infra pp. 388-89. 
91. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after Bilski: History and Theory, 
63 HASTINGS LJ. 53 (2011); Aaron 1. Zakem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject 
Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 2983, 2988 (2009) 
("[I]t has proven difficult to draw an exclusionary line which disallows inhibitive 
patents without prejudicing claims on novel and non-obvious technology ... "; see also 
Max S. Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of 
Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2012). 
92. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) 
93. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (CCPA 1970) (announcing the test); Gottschalk, 
409 U.S. at 63 (rejecting the "technological arts" test). 
94. Developed in three patent office decisions (Freeman, Waiter, and Abele), the 
test essentially consisted of first determining whether a mathematical algorithm was 
recited directly or indirectly in the claim and, if so, next determining whether the 
claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm itself or is applied to or 
limited by physical elements or process steps. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting the Freeman-Walter-Abele test) 
abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the same test for it 
was too restrictive a formulation). 
95. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882,893 (CCPA 1970) ("We cannot agree ... that 
these claims ... are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some or all the 
steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because it 
may be necessary for one performing the processes to think."). 
96. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (finding that a claim to a method of 
updating "alarm limits" was not covered by 35 U.S.C. § 101 since it amounted to the 
discovery of a mathematical formula which, although novel and since it was "not the 
kind of 'discovery' that the statute was enacted to protect"); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71 
(stating a claim to a method of converting binary-coded decimal numbers into decimal 
numbers was not an "invention or discovery" under § 101, even though the claimed 
method was to be performed by a computer, since the method had "no substantial 
practical application except in connection with a digital computer"); cf Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (holding that a claim to a process for operating a 
rubber-molding press was within "101, even though one element of the claim was the 
calculation of the appropriate time to open the press. The Court distinguished Flook as 
not containing any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the 
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an alarm system" and noted 
"excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas .... Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v. Benson and Parker v. Flook, 
both of which are computer-related, stand for no more than these long-established 
principles. "). 
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test97 ; and the "transformation" test.98 
The two industries most affected by the narrowing of the statutory 
language are computer software and medical technology - two of the most 
important industries in the U.S. economy. 
The early cases of Gottschalk,99 Flook,IOO and Diehrlol seemingly settled 
the question for the computer industry, but Bilski l02 and A lice 103 have 
reopened it. Most recently, the Supreme Court has held that certain types 
of medical treatment inventions, although within the meaning of "process," 
are nevertheless excluded from the definition of "statutory subject matt~r" 
and therefore cannot be patented because they represent no more than 
observing a correlation between a biological datum and a preferred method 
of treatment. 104 Further, it held that other types of inventions, although 
within the meaning of "composition of matter," are nevertheless excluded 
from the definition of "statutory subject matter" and therefore cannot be 
patented because they represent no more than extracting something which 
. 1 . d' 105 prevIOus y eXlste m nature. 
At a minimum, these cases complicate the innovator's decision 
concerning whether to seek patent protection for computer implementations 
or medical discoveries in general. Complication and uncertainty have two 
important consequences. They tend ,.10 favor trade secrecy in two fields 
where trade secret protection is a viable option,106 and they increase the 
cost of financing innovation in two fields where innovation is economically 
important. For example, while Congress would certainly have the power to 
exclude the provision of medical services from the type of progress the 
97. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835,841 (1989) ("The fact that a nonstatutory method is 
carried out on a programmed computer does not make the process claim statutory."). 
98. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
99. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
100. Flook, 437 U.S. 584. 
101. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
102. Bilski, 561 U.S. 593 (holding that although not all business methods were 
"categorically outside of ' 10 1'" the computer implemented method of "hedging risk 
and the application of that concept to energy markets" were not patentable as processes 
"because they are attempts to patent abstract ideas"). 
103. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2347 (holding that the claims did not "do more than 
simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement on a generic computer" and were therefore not patentable). 
104. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
105. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 
(2013). 
106. Computer programs can be maintained in secret while offering "Software As 
Service." Diagnostic test companies can maintain processes and evaluation criteria in 
secret and insist that samples be sent to them for analysis. 
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nation wants to encourage,107 it would be astonishing if it chose to do so, 
given the recent emphasis on the importance of improving access to 
medical care and cost containment and the hope that better data 
management will help reach those goals. 
IV. IMPROVING INNOVATORS' OPTIONS 
Innovators have three categories of options for dealing with the 
dilemma: (1) lobby for statutory change or challenge the constitutionality 
of the statute, (2) lobby for regulatory reform, or (3) work within the 
system. 
A. Statutory Reform and Constitutional Challenge 
Both the eighteen-month publication and the transition to first-to-file 
were part of a movement to harmonize United States patent law with 
international standards. Both were the result of lengthy lobbying and 
negotiation,108 and it seems unlikely that lobbying could reverse the trend, 
absent a major problem in implementation. 
It is tempting to argue that the publication of trade secrets before a patent 
is granted is, in effect, a taking of property (the trade secrets) without 
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 109 However, the rule 
has been in effect for more than forty years without challenge, and success 
seems unlikely. As discussed infra, an applicant can opt out of the 
eighteen-month publication requirement if the application is not also being 
filed in another country which publishes after eighteen months. Thus, it 
could be argued that the trade secret would be lost in any event, so nothing 
is being taken. 
The transition to first-to-file is more recent than the eighteen-month 
publication amendment, and it is also more open to constitutional 
challenge. 11o Commentators have noted the practical problems created by a 
107. It has done so in several areas. Nuclear weapons technology and tax strategy 
patents and claims "directed to or encompassing a human organism" are specifically 
excluded from patentability. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2010) ("No patent shall hereafter be 
granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of 
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon."); America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Although theoretically patentable, 
medical procedures are, in effect, not worth patenting as Congress has denied remedies 
for infringement. See also 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2002). 
108. See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 62. 
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." To constitute an unconstitutional taking, it would need to 
be shown that the applicant had a trade secret at the time it was "taken" by government 
pUblication.). 
110. See Oppenheimer, supra note 62, at 470-88 (discussing the arguments for and 
against constitutionality). 
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first-to- file system and its negative impact on innovators. I I I Congress, 
however, has the power to make laws that hurt innovators. The basic 
argument that the first-to-file system exceeds congressional power revolves 
around the constitutional authorization to offer limited term monopolies to 
"authors" and "inventors" I 12 and the contemporary definition of inventor, 113 
as reflected in every patent statute I 14 prior to the AlA amendments. ll5 All 
focus turns on an inventor being the first person to make a discovery, not 
the first person to reach the patent office. As the Constitution only 
authorizes rewards to "inventors," the first-to-file system is beyond 
constitutional authorization. 
B. Regulatory Reform 
One of the factors contributing to the delay in the PTO is its 
administrative requirement of "compact prosecution" under which, when a 
patent application is examined substantively, the PTO examiner is 
instructed that the review is to be "complete as to all matters,,116 and that 
"piecemeal examination should be avoided.,,117 While this may be a 
theoretically efficient way to examine applications, it results in delaying the 
time when an applicant receives a first substantive response to the 
1· . 118 app IcatlOn. 
This system could be modified by administrative action, a process which 
is much easier to achieve than statutory reform. Especially given the 
uncertainty created by recent Supreme Court decisions on statutory subject 
matter, modifying the system to allow applicants to opt out, or to at least 
request an early determination as to statutory subject matter, would provide 
111. See supra note 67. 
112. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
113. JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1123 (1st ed. 1755) 
(defining inventor as "a finder of something new"); see also WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 
THE LAW OF PATENTS AND USEFUL INVENTIONS, 211 n.2 (1890). 
114. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 57 (1884) (noting the 
first two patent statutes were adopted in early sessions of Congress. "The construction 
of the Constitution by the first act of 1790 ... by the men who were contemporary with 
its formation, many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of 
itself entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus 
established have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost 
conclusive. "). 
115. See Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1,5,1 Stat. 109, 109-10, 111 (1790); Patent Act of 
1793 §§ 3, 6, 1 Stat. 318,321-22 (1793); Patent Act of 1836 § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121 
(1836). 
116. 37 C.F.R. § 1.l04(b)(2002). 
117. MPEP § 707.07 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). 
118. See generally Oppenheimer, supra note 60 (detailing compact prosecution and 
a proposal for modifying the system). 
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significantly greater certainty at the time when the decision must be made 
whether to surrender trade secret protection by allowing publication of the 
application. 
From the perspective of the constitutional bargain, the requirements of 
35 U.S.C. § 101 are qualitatively different from the Section 102 and 103 
requirements that a patent be issued only for new, non-obvious inventions. 
If an application is rejected because the claimed invention fails to satisfy 
Section 102 or 103, it means there is already publicly available information 
describing the claimed invention119 or rendering it obvious,120 and 
therefore, since the information was publicly available, there was no trade 
secret to protect. l2J A Section 101 rejection, however, can apply even if the 
public does not have access to the information disclosed in the application 
(meaning that the applicant is, in fact, surrendering a trade secret.) 
There is precedent for preliminary determinations, even under compact 
prosecution. Even before an application receives a filing date, it is 
examined for compliance with certain requirements of the statute: whether 
the application appears to be complete, whether it includes any required 
drawings, whether it contains claims if a non-provisional application, 
whether it identifies the inventor, and whether the appropriate fees have 
been paid. 122 These examinations are carried out quickly, typically within a 
month of filing the application. 
In addition, there is at least one instance in which, even under the current 
system of compact prosecution, there is a preliminary examination for 
compliance with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101: where disclosure is 
directed to perpetual motion. 123 If the patent examiner believes the claims 
are directed to perpetual motion, the examiner is instructed to chalienge the 
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 without also conducting a prior art search or 
119. 35 U.S.c. § 102 (2011). 
120. Id. § 103. 
121. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1979) (amended 1985) (defining a trade secret 
as "information that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from 
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy"). 
Thus, for at least three reasons there can be no trade secret. By definition, a trade 
secret must be information which the applicant's competitors do not know. If publicly 
available, competitors can gain access through proper means, negating trade secret 
status. Finally, if publicly available, there is no way the applicant can take reasonable 
steps to protect it. 
122. MPEP § 503 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). 
123. MPEP § 707.07g(D) (instructing that "the best prior art readily available should 
be cited and its pertinency pointed out without specifically applying it to the claims"); 
see also Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding a 
rejection of claims to an "Energy Generation System Having Higher Energy Output 
Than Input" as unpatentable for lack of35 U.S.C. § 101 utility). 
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engaging in any of the other usual steps in examination. 
A determination of qualification as statutory subject matter is closely 
analogous to these types of determinations. It is an essentially legal 
analysis and does not require comparison of the claimed invention with 
. 124 pnor art. 
Authorizing a preliminary evaluation of statutory subject matter 
eligibility should therefore be within the PTO's authority to manage the 
prosecution process. Moreover, such a preliminary determination might 
well save costs by terminating some applications early in light of a negative 
view of patentable subject matter eligibility. This would benefit the PTO 
by saving examination costs, and it should also help reduce overall 
pendency times by reducing the need for examiners to conduct prior art 
searches l25 and would preserve the innovator's option to maintain trade 
secrets by abandoning an application where the PTO concludes that the 
subject matter is not patentable. 
The biotech and computer software industries would likely be the 
principal beneficiaries of this change. They are the industries that are front 
and center in the Supreme Court's definitional cases. They are enormously 
important to the U.S. economy, and they are industries which rely heavily 
on patent protection and suffer from above-average pendency times l26 
because of their reliance on patents to protect their massive investments in 
research and development. 127 
In many cases the availability of patent protection for corporations 
engaging in biotechnology R&D is essential to their survival ... 
[b ]ecause it generally takes so much investment to develop and get 
I e h . 128 approva lor a new t erapeutIc .... 
Besides the argument for enhanced industry security, allowing patent 
protection would stimulate this and related business sectors by creating 
jobs and contributing to a positive balance of trade that the United States 
generally enjoys within the intellectual property marketplace. 129 
124. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that statutory subject matter is a legal issue and is reviewed by courts without 
deference). 
125. As an indication of the relative complexity of statutory subject matter 
determinations and prior art evaluations, the MPEP covers the former in four pages, 
while the latter requires more than 100 pages. 
126. Thus, even if the Patent Office reaches its goal of reducing average pendency 
below eighteen months, it is unlikely that the average in these art units will reach that 
level. 
127. See infra note 129 (noting that estimates vary widely but put the cost to bring a 
new drug to market in the billions). 
128. Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene 
Fragments, and Licensing the "Useful Arts", 7 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 295, 321 (1997). 
129. Id. 321-22 (positing that today's development costs for a new drug are in the 
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Even Justice Breyer's argument against patent protection for basic 
discoveries acknowledges the difficulty and value of these discoveries. 130 
There is thus a reasonable case to be made for the PTO to revise its rules, 
at least to permit early determination of whether a claimed invention 
satisfies the statutory subject matter requirement. 
C. Interim Options 
In the absence of statutory change or regulatory reform, innovators have 
other options for mitigating the dilemma posed by the need to decide to 
surrender trade secrets before being assured of acceptable patent protection. 
The options are limited and imperfect. In some circumstances, an applicant 
can opt out of pre-grant publication. In other circumstances, an applicant 
can request expedited examination, and an applicant can use the 
Provisional Application option and a strategy of multiple filings to increase 
options (but at significant cost and without entirely eliminating the 
dilemma). 
1. Non-Publication Requests 
Current rules allow an applicant to affirmatively opt out of the pre-grant 
pUblication program. l3l In order to do so, the applicant must represent that 
the application will not be filed in any country that publishes applications 
before the grant of a patent, including under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.132 While this solution technically avoids the dilemma presented by 
the need to decide whether to surrender a trade secret in the absence of 
critical information, it exacts a significant price. In effect, it merely 
transfers the dilemma from "surrender trade secret or not" to "surrender 
international protection or not." 
billions of dollars. The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Annual 
estimate places the cost of developing a drug at $2.558 billion.); see also Matthew 
Herper, The Cost Of Creating A New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma To 
Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013 
/08/1Ilhow-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-
medicine/ (putting the cost of creating a new drug at $5 billion). 
130. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The justification for the principle does not lie in any 
claim that "laws of nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are 
not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly and time-
consuming ... and that research may prove of great benefit to the human race.") 
(internal citations omitted). 
131. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2) (2011); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.213 (2002); MPEP § 1122 
(9th ed., Mar. 2014). 
132. MPEP § 1122. 
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2. Expedited Processing Requests 
Current rules also allow an applicant to request expedited examination 
under certain conditions and upon payment of an extra fee.133 The scope of 
the expedited examination does not differ from the scope of regular 
examination. The application is simply placed in a separate queue, ahead 
of those in the regular examination queue, and there is therefore no 
guarantee that the examination will take place ahead of the eighteen-month 
publication date. 
3. Provisional Filings 
Provisional Patent Applications are not published, but they may be used 
to establish a priority date for a subsequent Non-Provisional Patent 
Application. 134 However, if a Provisional Application is used to establish 
priority, then the publication calculation runs from the date the Provisional 
Application was filed. 
A strategy can be used, however, to expand the applicant's options by 
filing multiple provisional applications. 
For example, an innovator could file a Provisional Application, then 
refile it three months later, then refile it again in another three months, and 
then refile it again in another three months and so on. 135 Shortly before one 
year after the initial filing, the innovator must make a decision whether to 
proceed with a Non-Provisional Application or not. If so, then the 
application will be published eighteen months after the initial Provisional 
filing (or, roughly six months after the Non-Provisional filing). If the 
applicant is confident, however, that no one else is developing the same 
invention, the first Provisional Application can be abandoned. In that case, 
another decision must be made shortly before the one-year anniversary of 
the second Provisional filing. The process is then repeated. 
It is not without risk. Another inventor may be working on the same 
innovation but not have made any public disclosure. If that inventor files 
first, they will get the patent. 
A variation, then, involves filing multiple Provisional applications and 
filing multiple Non-Provisional applications at the one-year anniversary of 
each Provisional application. This allows the innovator to review the 
competitive landscape near the eighteen-month anniversary of each 
Provisional filing, and make a determination at that time whether to 
proceed or not. The strategy is expensive and risky, only providing 
133. Id. § 708.02. 
134. 35 U.S.c. § 122. 
135. /d. (providing that provisional applications expire after twelve months so the 
decision cannot be postponed beyond that point). 
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periodic backstops rather than certainty that the innovation is being 
protected as well as possible, but it does expand the options for maintaining 
trade secrecy longer if this is a tolerable risk. However, the riskiness and 
expense of this strategy is itself evidence ofthe need for reform. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the current system of pre-grant publication,136 the pressures of a 
first-to-file system,137 and the uncertainty as to the scope of statutory 
subject matter,138 innovators face a dilemma: they must make an 
irrevocable decision to sacrifice trade secret protection before knowing 
whether they will get anything in return. Strategies exist to reduce the 
problem, but all come at a price and none are perfect. 
The Constitution authorized creation of the patent laws "to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors ... and to allow the public access 
to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control 
has expired. 139 Assuring inventors that their innovations will not be taken 
from them unfairly is a step toward motivating creativity and, more 
importantly, the disclosure that is the goal of the system. 
136. America Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4502, 113 Stat. 
1501, 501A-561 (1999) (providing for publication of most patent applications eighteen 
months after their initial filing date, whether the application had been allowed as a 
patent or not). Prior to 1999, patent applications were maintained in secrecy until 
issued as patents. Under that system, the problem of pendency did not arise. See also 
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(I)(a) (stating that patent applications are treated as confidential by 
the Patent Office until the eighteen-month publication date (or until the application is 
issued as a patent if the applicant certifies that international applications will not be 
filed)). 
137. See supra p. 383. 
138. See supra p. 385. 
139. !d. 
